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Three Restatements of Restitution 
Andrew Kull∗ 
For the time being, the American Law Institute is well pleased with its 
Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.  Work on the 
project admittedly consumed fifteen years (from 1996 to 2011), but 
progress was generally steady and meetings harmonious.  Its completion 
has been an occasion for official celebration, of which the present 
Symposium forms a festive part.  With actual publication still some weeks 
away, it is possible to hope that R3RUE will regain some of the influence 
of the original Restatement of Restitution—the work whose publication by 
the ALI in 1937 created the modern subject.  If we are indeed about to 
witness the long-overdue revival of U.S. restitution law that some optimists 
have predicted, the ALI’s decision to stand by its creation—re-restating the 
law of restitution for a profession that was well on its way to forgetting it—
will receive and deserve the credit. 
Whether R3RUE will have any such influence remains to be seen.  If 
the law of restitution in this country has been neglected so long that it is 
already past resuscitating, as some pessimists have warned, this story of 
another failed attempt to revive it will be of little interest to anyone not 
directly involved.  But should R3RUE meet a favorable reception, it might 
one day be interesting to recall how close the project came to not 
happening.  The success of the path-breaking 1937 Restatement had already 
been in some respects fortuitous.  To move beyond it, the ALI first had to 
live down the tumultuous episode of its attempted Restatement Second, 
Restitution (begun in 1980, abandoned in extremis in 1985).  Then in the 
early 1990s it had to resist the seductive proposal that it jettison the 
troublesome topic of Restitution and replace it with a newly conceived 
Restatement of Remedies.  Doing so would have largely obliterated the 
American law of restitution as an independent source of liability based on 
unjust enrichment.  But that is the course the ALI was ready to adopt, if it 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Law, Boston University; R. Ammi Cutter 
Reporter, Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (American Law Institute).  
The present essay is a lightly edited version of informal remarks made on February 25, 2011 
at the Washington and Lee Law Review Symposium:  Restitution Rollout:  Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment. 
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had only been able to persuade its chosen Reporter for Remedies to take on 
the job. 
The contours of restitution have been shaped in important ways by the 
accidents of ALI administration.  The Reporters of the 1937 Restatement of 
Restitution, Warren Seavey and Austin W. Scott of the Harvard Law 
School, were not the first to identify and describe a principle of liability for 
unjust enrichment, cutting across the division between law and equity.  An 
even more important Harvard figure, James Barr Ames, had made this 
discovery fifty years earlier.1  Ames inspired a number of successors, and 
his unjust enrichment principle could be traced through articles, treatises, 
and even a few legal opinions.  But the Harvard idea, if well known to an 
elite, came as news to most of the legal profession in 1937.  Its prompt and 
seemingly unhesitating acceptance was surely due in large part to the fact 
that it carried the imprimatur of the American Law Institute.  Lawyers thus 
encountered the law of unjust enrichment for the first time, not as a matter 
of academic speculation (however enlightened), but as a full-fledged 
division of the freshly restated American law, sharing a library shelf and a 
uniform presentation with Contracts, Torts, Property, and Trusts.  No one in 
those days was accusing the ALI of dangerous innovation; if they said 
restitution was a subject, lawyers were prepared to take their word for it. 
By far the boldest feature of the 1937 Restatement was one that today 
might easily pass unnoticed.  This was the administrative decision to 
combine the legal and equitable sides of restitution—the preexisting law of 
quasi-contracts and of constructive trusts—within a single Restatement 
project and a single volume.  The fundamental unity of these topics had 
been the essence of Ames’s original insight, and today it is the distinction 
rather than the combination that generally has to be explained; but their 
joint presentation in 1937 was a major step.   
The organizational breakthrough that gave the world the modern law 
of restitution—the decision to restate law and equity together—had not 
been the ALI’s original plan, and the wisdom of doing it this way was not 
immediately apparent.  Initial outlines of the Restatement of Trusts (for 
which Austin W. Scott served as Reporter) called for a chapter on 
constructive trusts to be appended at or near the end of that work, the way 
constructive trusts had been handled in the nineteenth century treatises.  
Such was the intended disposition as late as 1930, the year in which the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. For the pre-Restatement phase of the story, see Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames 
and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297, 303–
10 (2005). 
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ALI announced that it was also planning a separate Restatement of Quasi-
Contracts.2  Had the ALI adhered to its original scheme, restating this part 
of the law approximately as Ames had found it fifty years earlier, it is safe 
to say that restitution as we know it would not now exist—either in the 
United States or elsewhere in the common-law world. 
But by 1931 the appropriate treatment of constructive trusts was 
evidently being reconsidered;3 and at the ALI’s annual meeting in 1932, 
Director William Draper Lewis advised members that "whether 
constructive trusts should be part of the volume on Trusts or be more 
closely related to quasi-contracts has yet to be finally determined."4  In June 
1933, the ALI Council finally "determined to begin work as soon as 
possible on the volume which would contain those two closely related 
subjects, Quasi-Contracts and Constructive Trusts which together cover 
‘Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.’"5  It would be interesting to know 
who among the people involved had made the crucial suggestion, who had 
resisted, and how the decision was ultimately made—but these questions 
are sadly unanswerable.6  Once the decision had been made, the new project 
advanced with nearly incredible speed, obtaining formal approval less than 
three years later—despite pointed objections that the members did not know 
what they were approving—at the ALI’s annual meeting in May 1936.7  
                                                                                                                 
 2. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 5 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1930) (referring to a 
future "Tentative Draft of a Chapter on Constructive Trusts").  In his annual report of that 
year, Director William Draper Lewis listed quasi-contracts among "other subjects . . . which 
should be included in this ‘first Restatement of our law.’"  8 A.L.I. PROC. 50–51 (1930). 
 3. See 9 A.L.I. PROC. 58 (1931) (suggesting that future chapters of the Restatement of 
Trusts would cover "resulting trusts and possibly constructive trusts"). 
 4. 10 A.L.I. PROC. 41 (1932). 
 5. 11 A.L.I. PROC. 335 (1934). 
 6. Answers would once have been found in the ALI’s typewritten "Minutes of 
Conferences," a stenographic record of the frequent meetings of Reporters and Advisers for 
each of the projects concerned.  The catalogue of the Harvard Law Library formerly 
contained detailed bibliographical information for an extensive collection of these 
typewritten Minutes, which the Library had doubtless acquired among the papers of one or 
more of the members of the Harvard faculty who attended the meetings—a group that 
included Seavey, Scott, and Samuel Williston, among others.  But a request for the material 
in 2004 led to the discovery that it could no longer be found.  Circumstantial evidence, 
bolstered by unconfirmed rumor, suggests that the papers were moved to temporary storage 
during the renovation of the Library in 1997 and never seen again.   
 7. Most vocal was George B. Rose of Little Rock, Arkansas, who complained that he 
had in the two weeks preceding the meeting "received over 1000 pages of closely printed 
matter," that he had read as much of it as he could on the train to Washington, and that he 
doubted "whether there is anybody else in this hall who has done anything more."  13 A.L.I. 
PROC. 239–40 (1936).  Rose later proposed: 
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Between approval by the membership and actual publication in 1937, the 
Reporters made significant changes—one of which was an ill-advised, last-
minute decision to abridge the name from "Restatement of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment" to "Restatement of Restitution." 
Judging by contemporary reviews and judicial citations, the new 
Restatement with its doctrinal innovations was promptly and unhesitatingly 
accepted.  Seemingly at a stroke, the American Law Institute had created 
and made a place for a field of law that only a handful of academics had 
previously visualized.  This was an unparalleled achievement but a 
precarious one.  Only a generation later—just as restitution was finally 
taking hold in England, Canada, and elsewhere in the Commonwealth—the 
American parent version had entered an unmistakable decline.  Writers who 
have noticed its rise and fall point to a familiar handful of explanations.  
There was a broad displacement of private law from the law school 
curriculum in the 1960s, as American law schools increasingly became 
what John Langbein has called "academies for the study of public law."8  
Restitution had been the most recent addition to the private-law curriculum, 
and it suffered from the phenomenon of "last hired, first fired" when the 
curriculum was modified to reflect the lawyer’s role in the modern 
regulatory state.  (Newly developed courses on Remedies made it easier to 
drop the separate course on Restitution, and easier to overlook the extent to 
which "Restitution"—so poorly named—is as much about liabilities and 
defenses as about remedies).  And to the extent modern U.S. legal 
                                                                                                                 
That every gentleman who has studied this question and arrived at a mature 
opinion upon it shall lift his hand, and that only those who lift their hands and 
certify that they have studied this question be allowed to vote.  I do not believe 
in this hall there is one who will lift  his hand under these circumstances, and to 
vote on a matter  about which we know nothing is a crime against the science of  
jurisprudence.  
Id. at 253–54.  The assertion that the members were in no position to form a considered 
opinion of the final draft of "Restitution and Unjust Enrichment" went essentially 
unchallenged.  Before the vote was taken, Director Lewis gave unusually explicit assurances 
that any remaining problems would be addressed by the Reporter and the Council before 
publication: 
I do not want any of you to go away with the feeling that this particular volume 
on  Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, as far as it relates to the highly difficult 
question of quasi contracts, is going to be published before we are absolutely 
certain, as far as human ingenuity can make it, that the substantive law is correct 
and that it is  clear and uniform in style.  The manuscript will be given the  most 
careful examination. There is no undue hurry.  
Id. at 330. 
 8. John Langbein, The Later History of Restitution, in RESTITUTION:  PAST, PRESENT 
AND FUTURE 57, 61 (W.R. Cornish et al. eds., 1998). 
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scholarship is still focused on private law, it prefers topics more amenable 
to an "instrumental" or policy-based analysis; while the concern of 
restitution, as Ernest Weinrib once observed, is with "the private parts of 
the private law."9  A problem in restitution may be just as hard to analyze as 
a problem of torts or corporations, but the pay-off (if you get it right) often 
extends no further than justice between A and B. 
Larger historical forces probably doomed the Restatement of 
Restitution to neglect even if it had been more user-friendly, but the 1937 
Restatement has some striking defects.  Seavey and Scott had put the legal 
and equitable sides of the subject between the same covers, which was an 
enormously significant thing to do, but they made little effort to integrate 
the two sides.  Seavey’s Part I ("The Right to Restitution") and Scott’s Part 
II ("Constructive Trusts and Analogous Equitable Remedies") could almost 
have been incorporated without modification from the separate 
presentations the ALI had originally envisaged.  The composite 
Restatement presumes a reader for whom legal and equitable claims and 
remedies are still distinct and recognizable, even if put in a single volume 
for convenience.  It therefore presumes a lot of technical legal knowledge 
that its readers were about to begin to forget.  As Douglas Laycock has put 
it, the Restatement of Restitution was "laden with references to the pre-
1937 roots of restitution, references that become less and less familiar to the 
bar with each passing year.  The Federal Rules doomed the Restatement 
from its birth."10 
By the 1960s and 1970s, when the ALI was still engaged in the 
extended process of revision that produced the "Restatement Second," the 
Restatement of Restitution looked older than its years.  Almost before 
anyone could say that it was "due for replacement," people were hinting 
that it was overdue for replacement.  The subject came up in 1970—after 
many years in which the topic of restitution had gone entirely unmentioned 
at ALI annual meetings—when Dean William Prosser was discussing his 
work on the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.  Somebody asked Prosser 
what he planned to say about contribution between joint tortfeasors.  
Prosser replied that contribution is a problem in restitution.  The 
Restatement of Restitution authorized very limited contribution between 
tortfeasors, while the original Restatement of Torts said nothing about it: 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Professor Weinrib produced this apothegm in my hearing in the course of a 
colloquium at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law ca. 1994.  
 10. Douglas Laycock, Preliminary Report on a Restatement 2d of Restitution:  A 
Report to the Director of the American Law Institute 26 (Nov. 1987) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Now . . . on the assumption that some kind of revision of the restitution 
sections is called for, the question is: Where is it to be done? . . . 
[S]hould we assume priority and provide a section for Torts to be 
followed by Restitution, remembering that Restitution is still a dream as 
far as the Second Restatement is concerned?  No plans are yet made, as I 
understand it, as to when that Restatement will be started.  It might be 
ten years.  It might conceivably be longer.11 
Restitution was next mentioned in 1976 by Director Herbert Wechsler, 
who told the annual meeting, "I hope to see us get under way with work on 
the Restatement of Restitution, which is a big book that was published in 
the late thirties, but that will have to take its place in line."  Wechsler goes 
on to explain that the ALI had 
approximately $80,000 a year on which to run the whole restatement 
project. . . .  The president and I have made efforts to supplement the 
endowment that supports that work, but thus far without success.  
Unfortunately, it does not involve sex or race or civil liberties, and does 
not seem to produce much salivation on the part of foundation 
executives at the present time.12  
Further references to a hypothetical Restatement Second, Restitution 
were made in 1978 and 1979, when Allan Farnsworth was presenting the 
concluding pieces of Restatement Second, Contracts.  On the first of these 
occasions, Professor Farnsworth was explaining an illustration in which a 
policyholder submits an insurance claim for "total disability"; the insurer—
without investigation—sends payment for "partial disability"; whereupon 
the policyholder signs a receipt acknowledging "payment in full" and 
release of his claim.  The point in the Contracts context was that payment of 
the lesser amount is not consideration for the release.  This led to the 
following exchange:  
MR. PAUL W. WILLIAMS (N.Y.):  I would like to ask whether the 
debtor who paid the $500 thinking he was satisfying the debt of $1,000 
can get his $500 back—because many times it is done innocently.   
PROFESSOR FARNSWORTH:  That is a tough one and I always run 
into the Restatement of Restitution.  There will be a Restatement of 
Restitution, Second, and it seems to me that is the appropriate occasion 
for that.   
                                                                                                                 
 11. 47 A.L.I. PROC. 383 (1970) (emphasis added). 
 12. 53 A.L.I. PROC. 48–49 (1976). 
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Certainly anything that I would say in that regard attendant to this 
Illustration might be regarded as gratuitous if the Reporter and Advisers 
were to embark on such a project in the future.13 
A year later, Donald Rapson was grilling Farnsworth about a case in which 
"A makes an improper payment to B, and C knowingly gets the benefit of 
that improper payment.  Does not A have a right to restitution from C?  I 
thought you were saying earlier that that was the case."14  Farnsworth 
replied that his Contracts draft addressed only a limited set of restitution 
cases: 
We are not talking about the mistaken payment case.  That is dealt with 
in the Restatement of Restitution but not here. . . .  Most of the third-
party problems don’t come up.  You have to work to bring them in.  If 
there is a Restatement of Restitution, Second, that is the place to deal 
with them.  If there is not, it may be because of a feeling that these 
things are too hard to restate.15  
But the Institute was going to try.  The next phase of the story is not a 
happy one. 
In May 1980, Director Herbert Wechsler announced in his annual 
report that his colleague, Professor William F. Young of Columbia, had 
been at work since February of that year on a "reexamination and revision" 
of the Restatement of Restitution.  Five years later, Geoffrey Hazard’s first 
annual report as Director included this note on "Current Projects": 
RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF RESTITUTION. No submission on 
Restitution will be considered at this meeting.  Our agenda, particularly 
the Corporate Governance and Foreign Relations Law projects, are 
already very heavy.  In light of this constraint, it became useful to afford 
Professor William F. Young, the Reporter for Restitution, an extended 
period of concentration on analysis and drafting. We expect to have 
more from this project next year.16 
There would be no more.  Disregarding the time he must have spent 
preparing an initial response to Herbert Wechsler’s solicitation, Professor 
Young had been working on Restatement Second, Restitution for five solid 
years.  Those five years must have been as frustrating an experience as any 
ALI Reporter has ever had.  
                                                                                                                 
 13. 55 A.L.I. PROC. 182 (1978). 
 14. 56 A.L.I. PROC. 403 (1979). 
 15. Id. at 403–04 (emphasis added). 
 16. 62 A.L.I. PROC. 565 (1985). 
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Anyone involved with R3RUE who did not already know Professor 
Young got to know him as a result of Director Lance Liebman’s single 
most intelligent contribution to the project—namely, his idea to ask Bill 
Young if he would be interested to join the group as an adviser.  All of us 
came to admire Bill’s imaginative intelligence, his extensive knowledge of 
restitution and related fields, and his unfailing gentleness of expression and 
graciousness of spirit.  (These last two qualities may have served him better 
in the role of adviser than in that of reporter).  The careful written 
comments I received from Bill Young on each successive draft were among 
the most reliably helpful I received, and there are numerous points at which 
R3RUE has been improved as a direct result of his suggestions. 
Despite the Reporter’s tact, intelligence, and expertise, however, the 
attempt to produce a Restatement Second, Restitution went very badly.  A 
few vignettes will give the flavor. 
The project began under an ill omen.  In the months following 
Wechsler’s announcement, an all-star committee of advisers had been 
appointed:  the initial lineup included such luminaries as John Dawson, Dan 
Dobbs, Allan Farnsworth, Ellen Peters, Michael Traynor, John Wade, 
Charles Allen Wright, and John Frank, a former Yale Law professor who at 
this point was practicing law in Phoenix.17  Three days before the advisers 
met to discuss Preliminary Draft No. 1 in June 1981, Frank wrote to Young 
to express his regrets that he would be unable to join them in Philadelphia.  
Instead he was sending a memorandum, compiled with the help of half a 
dozen summer associates at Lewis & Roca whom Frank had assigned to 
review the draft.  The Reporter’s draft, by my calculation, had been sent out 
for review only two weeks earlier.  Frank’s letter with its attachments, 
uniformly critical, was fifty-three pages long.18 
Preliminary Draft No. 1 became Council Draft No. 1, submitted to a 
meeting of the ALI Council in October 1981.  The Council thought more 
work was needed.  A revised version was presented to the committee of 
advisers in September 1982 and to the Council two months later.  This 
document became Tentative Draft No. 1, presented for discussion and 
approval at the annual meeting the following May. 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Dawson shortly withdrew from the project, presumably because of ill health.  
Following the fateful 1984 annual meeting, with only a few months remaining before 
Restatement Second, Restitution would be abandoned, the committee of advisers was further 
reinforced with the addition of Stephen Breyer, Robert Keeton, and Douglas Laycock. 
 18. The letter and memorandum are reproduced among the materials relating to 
Restatement Second, Restitution in the American Law Institute Library of HeinOnline (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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The proceedings of the 1983 annual meeting are painful to read.  They 
have a nightmarish quality for anyone who has been an ALI reporter.  The 
first afternoon bogged down in discussion of Section 6(2), scarcely a 
quarter of the way into a fairly short tentative draft.  Here Professor Young 
had incautiously said there might be unjust enrichment of a party "whose 
conduct in negotiating for a gain or advantage . . . appears unconscionable 
in purpose or effect."19  The looseness of this last expression brought forth a 
torrent of objections.  If the meeting had been run by a surer hand, and one 
more solicitous of the Reporter—someone more like Lance Liebman—it 
should have been easy for the chair to announce that "the Reporter will 
consider it" and to move on from there, after 10 minutes’ discussion at the 
most.  Instead the wrangling over this one provision proceeded unchecked 
for what looks like an hour.  The atmosphere was thoroughly poisoned, and 
the remainder of the session was dominated by motions to redraft and 
recommit. 
When Restatement Second, Restitution came back to the Annual 
Meeting a year later, the project fared no better.  Tentative Draft No. 2 
began—unwisely I think—with a chapter on "constructive trust, equitable 
lien, subrogation, and marshaling of assets."  Almost immediately, the 
Reporter was confronted with a prearranged motion—submitted by John 
Frank and Robert MacCrate, both of them Council members—directing him 
to replace the word "subrogation" throughout the new Restatement with the 
word "substitution."  After a spirited debate this motion was easily defeated 
in a voice vote, but that would prove to have been the high point of the day.  
No more than halfway through, discussing a difficult section entitled 
"Apportionment of Gain from Proceeds and Products," Douglas Laycock 
was finding the draft "troubling" and moving to strike certain language; 
various members were moving to substitute their own editorial suggestions 
for the language of the Reporter; John Wade was urging that that the entire 
Tentative Draft be sent back to committee.  Motions from the floor led only 
to more motions, and the meeting concluded with the project in disarray.   
A draft containing "recommitted sections" was submitted to Council in 
December 1984, and one last Preliminary Draft was prepared and circulated 
for a meeting of advisers at the end of January 1985.  Sometime after this it 
was decided that the Reporter be afforded—as we have seen Geoff Hazard 
describe it—"an extended period of concentration on analysis and drafting." 
                                                                                                                 
 19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 6(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983) 
(emphasis added). 
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Restatement Second, Restitution would have been a difficult job in any 
event.  With the benefit of hindsight, it seems to me that Professor Young 
made tactical errors that tipped the balance against the success of his 
project.  He seems to have conceived the task before him as one of revising 
and improving the 1937 Restatement, starting not with the familiar parts of 
the subject but with its recognized difficulties.  The assumption for R3RUE, 
by contrast, was that we had to start on an entirely clean slate—indeed, that 
we were writing for a legal profession that knew no more about 
restitutionary claims and remedies than do reasonably bright first-year law 
students.  Instead of starting with what was easiest to understand and 
hardest to argue with—thereby building confidence among advisers, 
Council, and membership before tackling the more difficult parts of the 
subject—Bill Young confronted his second annual meeting with an 
ambitiously revisionist account of constructive trust, subrogation, and the 
tracing rules.  By the time R3RUE approached any of these thorny topics, 
nine or ten years into our project, many of the members would have 
approved anything we said because they were no longer paying attention. 
Three years after the decision to suspend work on Restatement 
Second, Restitution, ALI Director Geoffrey Hazard commissioned a report 
on the law of restitution from Professor Douglas Laycock, then at the 
University of Texas.  Hazard asked Laycock "to consider whether there is a 
coherent subject that is worth restating, and if so, the desirable contents of 
such a restatement."20  Laycock’s "Preliminary Report on a Restatement 2d 
of Restitution," dated November 1987, answered the two questions 
separately.  The first part of his memorandum addressed the parochial 
problem facing the ALI: whether to try again to revise the Restatement of 
Restitution.  The longer second part, presenting a practical summary of 
what the law of restitution covers and why it matters, was subsequently 
published as a well-known law review article.21  The first part was not 
published and is not generally available.  But for anyone curious about the 
origins of R3RUE, the first part of the Laycock memorandum is the single 
most important source. 
Laycock’s "Summary of Principal Conclusions" made the following 
points: 
 1.  Restitution is a distinct body of law, amenable to restatement. 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Laycock, supra note 10, at 1. 
 21. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
1277 (1989). 
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 2.  The defining characteristics of restitution are disputed, and its 
boundaries are amorphous. But there is practical consensus on the core 
contents of the field. . . . 
 3.  Restitution is of practical significance when it adds to the other 
sources of civil liability.  Much of restitution is practically significant in 
this sense, but not all of it. 
 4.  Restitution is not systematically taught in the law schools, and 
it is not litigated frequently enough to create a fully developed body of 
precedent in each jurisdiction.  Because the law is unfamiliar and 
undeveloped, a Restatement 2d could have unusual influence.  A good 
restatement might be especially valuable; a bad one might be especially 
harmful. 
 5.  Because lawyers are generally unfamiliar with restitution, it is 
especially important that a Restatement 2d be clearly organized and 
written. The unfamiliar language in which restitution arose, such as 
quasi-contract, should be avoided as much as possible. 
 6.  It is possible that the decline of professional attention to 
restitution is irreversible, and that a Restatement 2d would have little 
impact. 
 7.  The greatest difficulty in restating restitution is identifying a 
reporter.  Few if any scholars are comfortable with the entire field.22 
Short of offering to be the Reporter himself, Laycock’s endorsement 
of the project could hardly have been stronger.  But Hazard was suddenly 
unwilling to take "yes" for an answer.  He commissioned another report 
from another law professor: this one from Dale Oesterle, then of Cornell.  
(Several years earlier, Oesterle had published a noted article attacking the 
restitutionary tracing rules as arbitrary and irrational.23)  While this was in 
the works, Hazard’s annual report for 1989 advised the membership that the 
ALI was  
pursuing a restart of the Restatement Second of Restitution.  Some 
tentative drafts had been developed in this project, but we encountered 
difficult conceptual and drafting problems that required a further 
examination.  One study [obviously, the 1987 Laycock memorandum] 
has been completed and another is well along that give promise of 
supplying the necessary conceptual framework for this subject.24 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Laycock, supra note 10, at 3–4. 
 23. Dale Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated 
Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172 (1983). 
 24. 66 A.L.I. PROC. 484 (1989). 
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Oesterle’s promised study, dated June 1989, arrived a few weeks later.  On 
the question of what the ALI should be doing about Restitution, his 
conclusions were almost the opposite of Laycock’s.  In answer to the 
question "whether restitution . . . is an appropriate subject for a separate 
Institute restatement," Oesterle concluded "that it is not:  Either restitution 
principles should be included in each of the restatements of contracts, tort, 
agency, and property law or it should be included in a new Restatement of 
the Law of Remedies."25 
It was the Oesterle report, not the earlier Laycock report, that Hazard 
evidently found persuasive on this central point.  Addressing the annual 
meeting in 1990 he announced a change of direction: 
We are exploring a Restatement of Remedies.  This is sort of a daughter 
of Restitution.  We had begun Restitution some years back, had some 
difficulties with it, and reconsidered those difficulties.  A Restatement of 
Remedies would be even more complicated and challenging, but 
perhaps more coherent in the end. . . .  We are aware that the dimensions 
of this subject could approximate Godzilla.26   
A year later Hazard repeated, "we contemplate a Restatement of Remedies, 
building on work begun in Restitution."27  And a year after that, "we still 
have on the back burner the possibility of a Restatement of Remedies."28 
The relevant deliberations were taking place off stage at this point, 
where they remained for nearly five years.  They re-emerged into public 
view at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in 
January 1995, when the AALS Section on Remedies held a well-attended 
program devoted to the question, "Can and Should the Law of Remedies be 
Restated?  If So, How?"  The chairman of the Remedies section and the 
moderator of the program was Douglas Laycock, and Douglas Laycock had 
almost certainly prepared the list of questions announced for discussion—
some of which read as follows: 
Does anyone want a Restatement of Remedies?  What would be its 
benefits?  Would they be worth the cost?   
Would the project be manageable, or is remedies too all-inclusive to be 
restated?  Is there a core of people willing to do the work? 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Dale Oesterle, A White Paper on a Restatement Second of the Law of Restriction 
[sic] 3–4 (June 1989) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 26. 67 A.L.I. PROC. 13 (1990). 
 27. 68 A.L.I. PROC. 664 (1991). 
 28. 69 A.L.I. PROC. 11 (1992). 
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If there is to be a Restatement of Remedies, how should it be organized?  
Should there be a restatement of transsubstantive remedial principles, 
and also of remedies for particular wrongs? If only one of these, which 
one?29 
Announced speakers (in addition to the moderator) were Professors E. 
Allan Farnsworth, Mary Kay Kane, and Thomas D.  Rowe, Jr., all of whom 
were invited to discuss the treatment of remedies in various ALI projects; 
also Dale Arthur Oesterle, identified as "Respondent."  My own 
recollection of the session is that there was a lively discussion of the pros 
and cons of various ways in which the ALI might restate the law of 
remedies, and that no one in the room expressed any regret at the prospect 
that by so doing the ALI would be abandoning the Restatement of 
Restitution until I stood up to do so myself.  (I also recall that my remarks 
were received with a general air of "how did he get in here?" . . . but in this 
I may be mistaken.) 
In retrospect, I think I can guess what had been happening off-stage 
between 1990 and 1995.  My surmise is that Geoff  Hazard was attracted by 
Dale Oesterle’s suggestion that the ALI forget about Restitution and 
undertake instead a Restatement of Remedies, and that starting about 1990 
he had been trying to persuade Doug Laycock to take the new project on.  
The questions proposed for discussion by the Remedies section were so 
neatly formulated because they were the questions that Laycock had been 
asking himself for several years.  I know (because he told me) that Laycock 
was at one time thinking seriously about doing it.  Shortly after the AALS 
session in January 1995, however, Professor Laycock decided that he would 
not be Reporter for a Restatement of Remedies.  The announcement was 
made in Geoff Hazard’s annual report that May: 
We have continued interest in a project for a Restatement of Remedies, 
or perhaps a revisiting of the Restatement of Restitution.  A Remedies 
project obviously would be wider in scope, and correspondingly more 
formidable, than one on Restitution. . . .  We had in mind a candidate for 
Reporter but that opportunity has, alas, disappeared.  We are open to 
suggestions.30 
I have no idea what happened over the next twelve months.  But in his 
1996 report, Hazard reverted to the subject in these terms:  "I have talked to 
you several times about Remedies.  It turns out, I think, that we might be 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Association of American Law Schools, Proceedings of the 1995 Annual Meeting 
66 (1997). 
 30. 72 A.L.I. PROC. 461 (1995). 
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well advised to redefine the project back to the subject of restitution from 
which remedies originally sprang in the mind of the Director."31  And a 
week or 10 days after that year’s annual meeting, I received a letter from 
Geoff asking whether I would be interested in serving as Reporter for a new 
Restatement of Restitution, should the ALI decide to undertake one.  If so, 
would I prepare a memorandum explaining how I would go about it?  I did, 
and my suggestions were discussed at a "proto" advisers’ meeting for 
R3RUE in June 1997.  (Geoff apparently wanted to be sure his untried 
Reporter was presentable, and he was holding a kind of try-out for advisers 
at the same time).  Progress thereafter was generally steady, and meetings 
harmonious . . . .  But this is where we came in. 
                                                                                                                 
 31. 73 A.L.I. PROC. 11 (1996). 
